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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20010551 -SC
v.

Priority 13

BRENT MAUCHLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1996).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has questioned the soundness of the corpus delicti rule since 1957.
Should Utah now join the growing number of jurisdictions that have abandoned the
corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard?
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness,
giving no deference to its conclusions of law. State v. A.T., 2001 UT 82, <I 5, 34 P.3d
228.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case involvps interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521(1)
(1999), which states:
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent
to defraud:
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an
application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy,
certificate, or contract;
(b) presents, or causes fo be presented, any oral or written statement
or representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or
other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract,
or in connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of
damages for personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing
that the statement or representation contains false or fraudulent
information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim;
(c) knowingly accepts & benefit from proceeds derived from a
fraudulent insurance act;
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or
artifice to obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises,
or material omissions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Ifiial Court Proceedings
The State charged defendant gnd his wife with insurance fraud and theft by
deception, both second degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-521 and
76-6-405 (1999). R. 2-3. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the only
evidence of his guilt was his confessiion, but it was inadmissible because the State could

not satisfy the corpus delicti rule. R. 33-39. The trial court denied the motion. R. 98-99,
116: 9-10. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of attempted
insurance fraud, and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion. R. 85, 89-96.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five
years, but it suspended the prison sentence, placed defendant on probation for three years,
and ordered that he serve sixty days in the Salt Lake County Jail or perform 300 hours of
community service. R. 117: 5-6. The trial court also ordered that defendant pay full
restitution, a S500 fine, a surcharge, and a SI50 recoupment fee. R. 117: 6.
The Direct Appeal
In the court of appeals, defendant argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the
State had satisfied the corpus delicti rule. State v. Mauchley, 2001 UT App. 177, U 1,
attached as Addendum A. The State conceded that it had not satisfied the corpus delicti
rule. See id., Add A. Nevertheless, it argued that Utah should join the federal courts and
the growing number of state courts that have abandoned the corpus delicti rule in favor of
a trustworthiness approach to determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession.
See Brief of Appellee, filed in the court of appeals, case no. 20000682-CA. The State
argued that the trial court's order should be affirmed on the alternative ground that the
confession was trustworthy, and therefore admissible. Id.
The State recognized that this Court, rather than the court of appeals, should
decide the issue. Accordingly, the State filed a suggestion for certification of the case to
this Court. See Manchley, 2001 UT App. 177 at 1| 2, Add A. The court of appeals
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declined to certify the appeal and reversed tne trial court, based on the State's concession
that it had not satisfied the corpus ddlicti rule. Id at «|3, Add A.
Certiorari Review Granted
The State petitioned this Coup to issue a wnt of certiorari and review whether
Utah should adopt the trustworthiness standard. See Petition for Wnt of Certiorari. This
Court issued the writ.
STAlEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant's motion to dismisls was submitted on the following stipulated facts:
On the night of January 5, 1995, the Defendant and his wife,
Kathleen Bolton, checked into the ER at the FHP Hospital in South Salt
Lake claiming to have fallen nto [a] hole caused by an uncovered water
meter in the street outside FHP. An off duty police officer working secunty
for FHP was shown the hole ind bamcaded it until it could be filled in. It
was later determined during an independent investigation by the relevant
insurance company that a conlstruction truck may have run over the meter
breaking the manhole cover.
Both Defendant and hils wife received medical attention for their
claimed injuries. The insurance claim was made to Reliance Insurance Co.
who apparently insures South Salt Lake City. After civil litigation
regarding the amount of damagees and who was at fault for the open
manhole, the insurance company settled with Defendant and his wife for
release of all claims in the amount of $50,000 on August 17, 1998. There
was never any question that Oefendant and his wife had fallen in the hole
during the investigation and lti gation m this case.
On February 9, 1999, |he Defendant went to the South Salt Lake
police department and told Dkectiv e Smartt that he and his wife had seen
the open manhole and had fabricated the story of falling in so they could
obtain money for the fabncated accident. Defendant and his wife were then
charged with Insurance Fraua in this case.
R 37-38.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGIMENT
This Court has questioned the validity of the common law corpus delicti rule for
nearly half a century The time has come to abandon the corpus delicti rule and join the
growing number jurisdictions that have adopted the trustworthiness standard for
determining whether a defendant's out-of-court statements can be used against him
Jurisdictions have abandoned the corpus delicti rule because it is unsound For
example, the rule fails to serve its own purposes, its numerous exceptions further
undermine its rationale, and it obstructs justice by hindering and even preventing
discovery of truth Jurisdictions have adopted the trustworthiness standard because it
better protects defendants and increases the factfinder's ability to ascertain truth.
In this case the State produced substantial independent evidence establishing the
trustworthiness of defendant's confession. Therefore, defendant's confession was
admissible.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH SHOULD JOIN THE GROWING NUMBER OF
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE
TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD.

Although defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt, the court of appeals reversed
his conviction on the basis of the corpus delicti rule In Utah, the corpus delicti rule is a
judicially created rule requiring that before a defendant's inculpatory statements can be
introduced against him, the State must prove, by evidence independent of the defendant's
statements, that a crime occurred. State v Johnson, 821 P 2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991)

5

The independent evidence must cleatly and convincingly show: "(i) "[t]hat a wrong, an
injury, or a damage has been done/ &nd (ii) 'that such was effected by a criminal agency,
i.e., without right or by unlawful me^ns.'" Id. at 1162, 1163 (quoting State v. Johnson, 83
P.2d 1010, 1014 (Utah 1938) (alteration in original)).1
Nearly half a century ago this Court acknowledged the unsoundness of the corpus
delicti rule. See State v. Weldon,3\q P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957). Speaking of the rule,
this Court noted that "[notwithstanding its universality, eminent authorities have gravely
doubted its validity." Id.
Over ten years ago this Court (recognized the trustworthiness standard as an
alternative to the corpus delicti rule. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1163 n.9. However, this
Court reserved the opportunity to consider the trustworthiness standard because the
evidence in Johnson was sufficient upder the old rule. Id.
The opportunity lacking in Johnson presents itself in this case because the State
concedes that the independent evidence did not establish the corpus delicti of insurance

i

The term "corpus delicti" is also generally used to describe the sum of the
elements that must be proven in order to convict. See Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77
n.9 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Frederick v. State, 37 P.3d 908, 931 n.8 (Okla. Crim. App.
2001). In this general sense, the State must always prove the "corpus delicti" to obtain a
conviction.
This general use of the term should not be confused, however, with the more
specific "corpus delicti rule," which governs the admissibility of a defendant's out-ofcourt statements. See Johnson, 821 IP.2d at 1162, 1163. Therefore, the issue before the
Court is not whether the State must drove the "corpus delicti," in the general sense, to
obtain a conviction. Rather, the issue is whether the State should no longer be required to
satisfy the "corpus delicti rule" befoije a defendant's out-of-court statements can be used
to establish his Ruilt.
6

fraud. See Mauchle\\ 2001 LT App. 177, <[ 1, Add. A. For the reasons explained below,
this Court should abandon the common law corpus delicti rule and adopt the
trustworthiness standard.
A.

A growing number of jurisdictions have abandoned the corpus
delicti rule.

The federal courts and a growing number of state courts have abandoned the
corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. The United States Supreme
Court did so in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91-94 (1954). See United States v.
Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999) {"Opper rejected a view which had earlier
been the rule in many jurisdictions and was deeply rooted in the common law that
independent evidence was required to corroborate the corpus delicti/'). The Opper Court
discussed the divergence among the circuit courts of appeal in applying the traditional
corpus delicti rule and then concluded, "we think the better rule to be that the
corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish
the corpus delicti." 348 U.S. at 93. The Court then announced the trustworthiness
standard: "[i]t is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial
independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement."
Id. The Court clarified that "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential
facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." Id. In the companion
case of Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954), the Court further explained that
"[a]ll elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or
corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent
7

evidence to bolster the confession itseir and therebv pro\e the offense 'through' the
statements of the accused."
Following Opper, the federallcourts quickly adopted the trustworthiness standard.
The Tenth Circuit, for example, rejected the corpus delicti rule in Brasuell v United
States, 224, F.2d 706, 711 (10th Cir. 1955). In 1988 the Seventh Circuit declared that "the
corpus delicti rule no longer exists ih the federal system, where the requirement is instead
that there must be substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the
trustworthiness of the statement." United States v Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir.
1988).
A growing number of states have followed suit. By 1978 at least five states had
discarded the corpus delicti rule inflavorof Opper's trustworthiness approach. See Julian
S. Millstein, Note, Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for the Corpus
Delicti Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1219 n.83 (1978). By 1993, at least ten states
embraced the trustworthiness approach. See Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason *
Requiring Independent ProofofthelCorpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an
Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F.|L. REV. 385, 413 (1993).
Currently, at least twelve states, plus the District of Columbia, have completely
abandoned the corpus delicti rule in| favor of a trustworthiness approach.2 See State \

2

In addition, a California atipellate court applied the trustworthiness standard in
People v Cuevas, 280 P 2d 831,833 (Cal Dist Ct. App 1955); however, the corpus
delicti rule remains the law in California. See People v Ochoa, 966 P 2d 442, 472 (Cal
1998).
8

Hafford. 746 A.2d 150, 173-74 (Conn. 2000) (adopting the trustworthiness standard for
all crimes); Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1986) ("the adequacy of
corroborating proof is measured not by its tendency to establish the corpus delicti but by
the extent to which it supports the trustworthiness of the admissions.") (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 589 F.2d 716, 718-19 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Reynolds v. State, 309 S.E.2d
867, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) ("corroboration in any material particular satisfies the
requirements of the law."); State v. Yoshida, 354 P.2d 986, 990-91 (Haw. 1960) ("we find
sound the reasoning of and align with the authorities which support the rule that does not
require full proof of the corpus delicti to be established independently of the confession
before it may be resorted to."); People v. Brechon, 390 N.E.2d 626, 629 (111. Ct. App.
1979) ("Independent evidence does not have to corroborate the proof as to any particular
element of the crime charged but only establish a tendency to inspire belief in the truth of
the accused's confession or admission."); In r^: Welfare ofM.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 735
(Minn. 1984) ("not all or any of the elements [of the crime] had to be individually
corroborated but could be 'sufficiently substantiated by independent evidence of
attending facts or circumstances from which the jury may infer the trustworthiness of the
confession.'") (quoting Smoot v. United States, 312 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); State v.
Zysk, 465 A.2d 480, 483 (N.H. 1983) ("Proof of the cnme by evidence independent of the
confession is not necessary. There need only be sufficient corroboration to indicate that
the confession is trustworthy."); State v. Paris, 414 P.2d 512, 515 (N.M. 1966)
("corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to
9

establish the corpus delicti, but. . . the Government must introduce substantial
independent evidence which would tfend to establish the trustworthiness of the
statement."); State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487, 495 (N.C. 1985) (holding that in all but
capital cases, "it is no longer necessary that there be independent proof tending to
establish the corpus delicti of the crirtie charged if the accused's confession is supported
by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness."); Fontenot
v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla. C^im. App. 1994) ("we now reject the corpus delicti
line of analysis and reaffirm this Coulrt's pnor adoption of the standard which requires
only that a confession be supported by 'substantial independent evidence which would
tend to establish its trustworthiness."') (quoting Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93
(1954)); State v. Osborne, 516 S.E.24 201, 204-05 (S.C. 1999) ("the corroboration rule is
satisfied if the State provides sufficient independent evidence which serves to corroborate
the defendant's extra-judicial statements and, together with such statements, permits a
reasonable belief that the crime occurred."); Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (noting that under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
"oral statements . . . are admissible ifl at the time they were made they contained assertions
unknown by law enforcement but lat^r corroborated."); Holt v. State, 117 N.W.2d 626,
632-33 (Wis. 1962) (holding that corroboration of any significant fact is sufficient to
allow conviction based on confession).
Four additional states have erribraced the trustworthiness standard, but have
ambiguously applied it by also discussing the traditional corpus delicti standard. See
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Jacinth v. State, 593 P.2d 263, 265-66 (Alaska 1979) (applying both the trustworthiness
and corpus delicti standards); State v. True* 316 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Neb. 1982) (holding
that only slightly corroborated confession is sufficient to establish guilt, but also
discussing traditional corpus delicti requirements); State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 60-61
(N.J. 1959) (holding that evidence independent of the confession must tend to establish is
trustworthiness and prove loss or injury); State v. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tenn. Cnm.
App. 1986) (applying both the trustworthiness and corpus delicti standards).
In at least three states, supreme court justices have written well-reasoned
dissenting or concurring opinions urging rejection of the corpus delicti rule and adoption
of the trustworthiness standard. See Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441, 445-46 (Fla. 1993)
(Shaw, J., dissenting) (stating that the corpus delicti rule "is an anachronism," and "a
technicality that impedes rather than fosters the search for truth."); People v. McMahan,
548 N.W.2d 199, 203-09 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., dissenting) (stating that the corpus
delicti rule "promises too much, while it delivers too little."); State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904,
907-11 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) ("Stare decisis should not stand in the
way of enhancing the truthfinding purpose of criminal trials.").
Even states that retain the corpus delicti rule have recognized the rule's extensive
criticism. State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d 160, 164 (Me. 1983) ("Commentators have decried
the confusion [surrounding application of the corpus delicti rule]."); State v. Hansen. 989
P.2d 338, 346 (Mont. 1999) ("Eventually, the corpus delicti rule outlived its usefulness
and the rule was thoroughly disparaged by commentators."); Sheriff, Washoe County v
11

Dhadda, 980 P.2d 1062, 1065 n.l (Nev. 1999) ("Commentators have generally agreed
that the corpus delicti rule is no longer needed . . . ."); State v. Ralston, 425 N.E.2d 916,
919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) ("Other jurisdictions and text writers assert that the purpose o(
the corpus delicti rule is met if the state produces independent evidence showing the
trustworthiness of the confession/'); \State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 222 (Wash. 1996) ('The
corpus delicti rule has been criticized by courts and legal commentators.").
This Court has also acknowledged the questionable policies behind the corpus
delicti rule. See State v. Weldon,2>\A P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957). In Weldon this Court
noted that "[notwithstanding its universality, eminent authorities have gravely doubted
its validity." Id. at 355. Although recognizing that "[t]he arguments presented by those
who criticize the rule are not without some merit/' id. at 356, this Court nevertheless
applied the rule "in deference to the time honored and important precept of our law that it
is better that ten guilty go free, than that one innocent be punished." Id.
The corpus delicti rule remains the law in Utah. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d
1150, 1162-63 (Utah 1991); Sate v. DeHart, 2001 Ut App. 12, 17 P.3d 1171.
Nevertheless, this Court has included language in some opinions acknowledging the trend
toward the trustworthiness approach For example, in State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010,
1015 (Utah 1938), overruled in part and on other grounds by State v. Crank, 142 P.2d
178, 188 (Utah 1943), this Court stated, "[cjonfessions are necessarily weak or strong
evidence according to the circumstances attending the making and proving of them; and
we think the only safe general rule id to require some other evidence corroborative of
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their truth ' This Court further explained that "such corroborative evidence mu^t con^ibt
of facts or circumstances appeanng in evidence independent of the confession and
consistent therewith, tending to confirm and strengthen the confession." Id at 1016
In Weldon, this Court went so far as to declare that, "the generally accepted view,
to which we give our approval, is that the evidence independent of the confession need
not establish the corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof" 314 P 2d at 356
(emphasis added) The court further explained that, "the whole evidence, including the
confession, may be considered together in determining whether the corpus delicti has
been satisfactorily established/' Id
Finally, in Johnson, this Court acknowledged the opportunity to address the
trustworthiness standard. See 821 P 2d at 1163 n.9. It reserved this opportunity for a
later case, however, finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the traditional
corpus delicti rule. See Id, The time has come for Utah to adopt the trustworthiness
approach.
B.

Stare decisis does not justify retaining the corpus delicti rule.

This Court "is not inexorably bound by its own precedents." See State v Xlenzies,
889 P 2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (overruling the automatic reversal rule of Crawford \
Manning, 542 P 2d 1091(Utah 1975) Rather, this Court "will follow the rule of law
which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was
onginally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more
good than harm will come by departing from precedent " Id \s will be demonstrated
13

below, the corpus delicti rule is no longer sound because (1) it poorly serves it own
purposes, (2) its numerous exceptions further undermine its rationale, and (3) it obstructs
justice by hindenng and even preventing discovery of truth Abandoning the rule in favor
of the trustworthiness standard will produce more good than harm, see Menzies, 889 P 2d
at 399, because it better protects a aeiendant's rights, while increasing the factfinder's
ability to ascertain truth.
1.

The corpus delicti rule is unsound because it poorly serves
its own purposes.

The corpus delicti rule developed in England in response to the very specific
problem of supposed murder victims "reappearing" after their "murderer V execution
See Mullen, 27 U S.F L. REV at 390-401. Perry's Case, for example, is often cited as a
"galvanizing force" in the development of the corpus delicti rule Id In that case a
suspect confessed to murder and implicated his mother and brother as well. Id After all
three were executed, the supposed victim appeared and recounted a bizarre story about
being sold into slavery in Turkey. /J/.
Whatever its origins, "[i]t is unclear whether the corpus delicti rule ever became
part of English common law." Id at 400-401 If it did, "it was an ill-defined feature of
the law related to homicide and was rarely, if ever, extended to other crimes " Id See
also, 7 John H Wigmore, Evidence,^ § 2072, at 524 (revised by James H Chadbourn
1978) (noting that the English rule was limited to homicide cases) As Wigmore
observed, "[t]he policy of any rule 0t the sort is questionable " § 2070, p 510
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In \menca, the rule remains a creature of the common law, "no court has ever
held that the rule is constitutionally grounded " Mullen, 27 U S F L REV at 387,
XlcCormick on Evidence, § 145 at 521 (John W Strong ed , 5 h ed 1999) American
jurisdictions, however, have expanded the rule beyond its narrow English origins and
applied it to all types of cnmes. See State v Weldon^U

P 2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957) ("In

this country, the corpus delicti rule is applied to all cnmes")
Modern courts and commentators generally justify the corpus delicti rule as
serving three purposes: first, protecting the mentally unstable who falsely confess,
second, avoiding reliance on repudiated confessions out of concern for voluntanness, and
third, promoting better law enforcement by reducing reliance on confessions. Mullen, 27
U S F. L REV at 401. "In every case," however, "the rationale proves too much while
the corpus delicti rule delivers too little." Id
First, the rule does little to protect defendants who are mentally unstable and
falsely confess. Because the rule only applies to out-of-court statements, see Weldon, 314
P 2d at 354, it offers no protection to the determined lunatic who confesses to an
imaginary cnme and proceeds to plead guilty See Mullen 27 U S F L. REV at 402-03
Nor does the rule protect the person who falsely confesses to an actual cnme, because it
requires only proof that a cnme was committed by someone Id
Second, the idea that the corpus delicti rule avoids reliance on involuntary
confessions is fallacious Ironically, the corpus delicti rule allows the use of a dubious
confession if the prosecution can produce independent evidence of a cnme, yet
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completely bars the use of a conced^dly voluntary confession if there is no evidence ot
the crime other than the confession. Id. at 405.
Furthermore, modern constitutional and statutory protections surpass the rule's
utility as a means of protecting the rfientally unstable, or avoiding reliance on
involuntarily confessions. See People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Mich. 1996)
(Boyle, J., dissenting). For example^ a confession obtained by knowing exploitation of a
defendant's insanity violates due process and is inadmissible, even if other evidence
corroborates the confession or establishes guilt. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,
206-07 (1960). Likewise, the totality of the circumstances, including government
coercion and, where applicable, a defendant's mental disabilities and deficiencies, may
render a confession involuntary and I there fore inadmissible. State v. Rettenberger, 1999
UT 80,ffl[15, 45, 984 P.2d 1009. When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his
statement, the State bears the burden of demonstrating voluntariness. Id. at f 45 (quoting
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Ufah 1992)).
Additionally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), assures that all defendants
are advised of their right to remain Silent and their right to the presence of counsel dunng
a custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has also established a brightline rule forbidding the police from initiating an interrogation following a defendant's
exercise of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484 (1981); Michigan v. Jackson, 4f5 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
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A cnminal detendant also has a statutory right to petition for an evaluation ot hir>
mental competency at any stage of a cnminal proceeding See UTAH CODE ANN ^ 77-153(1) (1999) A tnal court may also raise the issue of a defendant's mental competency at
any time Id at § 77-15-4 The above-cited precedents and statutes provide a formidable
bulwark of modern protections designed to protect a cnminal defendant from involuntary
self-mcnmination Thus, any "suggestion that the corpus delicti rule meaningfully
buttresses the nght against coerced self-incnmination is anachronistic at best ' Mullen,
27 U S F L REV at 405.
Finally, contemporary junsprudence has also undermined the rationale that the
corpus delicti rule promotes better law enforcement 'The notion that law enforcement
can be made better by bamng confessions ignores the fact that voluntary confessions are
sometimes the product of good law enforcement." Id at 406. When the police skillfully
obtain a confession from a suspect in full compliance with the constitutional protections
outlined above, it does not promote good law enforcement to bar admission of the
confession on the grounds of the corpus delicti rule Id "Indeed

," as both this Court

and the United States Supreme Court have recognized, "admissions of guilt by
wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable " State v Piansiaksone, 954 P 2d
861, 865 (Utah 1998) (quoting Oregon v Elstad. 470 U S 298, 305 (1985))
The law enforcement improvement rationale also fails to explain the limits ot the
rule Mullen, 27 U S F L. REV at 406 If the rule is designed to force the police to ^oKe
a cnme unassisted by the suspect, then the rule should not allow the police to rely on the
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suspect's confession to establish thet most important part of their case: "'that the accused
was the guilty agent.'" State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (quoting State
v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah l]987) (noting that the rule does not require the State
to show *4that the accused was the guilty agent.")).
The corpus delicti rule, as Judge Posner observed, was "never well adapted to its
purpose." United States v. Kerley, «38 F.2d 932, 939-40 (7th Cir 1988). A rule that fails
to serve its own purposes is unsound and should be abandoned.
2.

The rule's numerous exceptions also demonstrate its
infirmity.

States that retain the corpus delicti rule have carved out numerous exceptions to
the rule and also reduced the amount of evidence necessary to satisfy it. Mullen 27
U.S.F. L. REV. at 407. This need t0 create exceptions and modifications further
demonstrates the rule's infirmity. As one commentator observed, "[t]he common need to
work around the rule to achieve justice suggests that justice would be better served by
abandoning the rule." Id. at 417.
For example, in Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d 462, 466-67 (Ind. 1990) the
Indiana Supreme Court observed that "[s]trict adherence to the corpus delicti rule, in light
of its declining utility, presents gre^i difficulties in modern criminal law." Thus, the court
created an exception to the rule allowing for the admission of confessions to multiple
crimes, even though independent evidence only established the corpus delicti of the
principle crime. See id.
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Several states have realized that the rule is poorly suited for application in some
criminal prosecutions. In Anzona, for example, the legislature has abolished the corpus
delicti rule in automobile collision cases resulting in injury or death. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.

§ 28-1388(G); State v. Dougherty, 845 P.2d 474, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).

The Anzona Court of Appeals further narrowed the rule when it held the rule inapplicable
to cnmes in which statements themselves are the corpus delicti, such as pandenng,
solicitation, promotion of gambling, or offenng to sell narcotics. Id at 478. Likewise,
the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the trustworthiness standard in a prosecution for
conspiracy to commit murder. See Doyle v State, 921 P.2d 901, 911 (Nev. 1996). These
states have already discovered the increasing difficulties in applying the corpus delicti
rule to the more numerous and complex cnmes set forth in modern cnminal codes.
McCormick on Evidence, §147 at 528 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). This is
especially true for crimes "that may not have a tangible corpus delicti, such as attempt
offenses, conspiracy, tax evasion and similar offenses." Id.
Some states have relaxed the rule by not requinng proof of the corpus delicti to
exclude all inferences of a noncriminal cause of the harm or injury. See Commonwealth
v Williams, 417 A.2d 1200, 1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("A corpus delicti may exist even
though the circumstances may also be consistent with innocence."); People v Ochoa* 966
P.2d 442, 473 (Cal. 1998) (involving a rape charge).
Several states, including Utah, have also excluded application of the rule to certain
categones of statements. See Mullen 27 U S F L REV at 409-10. In Utah and
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Pennsylvania, for example, the rule only applies to inculpatory statements. See State \
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (explaining that the rule only limits the use of
a defendant's inculpatory statement^); Commonwealth v. Verticelli, 706 A.2d 820, 824
(Pa. 1998) ("Only inculpatory statements of an accused are subject to the protection of the
corpus delicti rule."). Furthermore, Johnson also excludes application of the rule to
statements made before or during the commission of a crime. Id. at 1162-63. Other states
have a similar exception. See Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 410-11.
States have further limited th e corpus delicti rule by reducing the amount of
evidence necessary to satisfy the rule. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held
that independent evidence of the corpus delicti need not prove commission of the crime
charged by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Weller, 644 A.2d 839, 841 (Vt.
1994) ("Slight corroboration may be sufficient.")- Likewise, in Massachusetts, "the
standard for the corroboration rule

. is merely that there be some evidence, besides the

confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that is, that the crime was
real and not imaginary." Commonwealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Mass. 1991)
(internal quotations omitted).
These numerous exceptions evidence the infirmity of the corpus delicti rule. As
one commentator observed, the creation of so many exceptions to the rule has "generally
distanced the corpus delicti rule even further from its nominal purposes. The exceptions
consume much of the rule and the relaxed evidentiary standard so dilutes the remainder
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that any argument for retaining the corpus delicti rule is seriously undercut/' Mullen 2"
U S F L. REV. at 407.
3.

The rule is also unsound because it obstructs justice by
hindering and even preventing discovery of truth.

*'[T]he central purpose of a criminal tnal is to decide the factual question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence/' Colorado v Connelly, 479 U S. 157, 166(1986)
(quoting Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 U S 673, 681 (1986)). The exclusion of
evidence, even to protect constitutional guarantees, deflects a criminal tnal from this
basic purpose. See id. The exclusion of evidence to serve an anachronistic and unsound
common law rule, however, obstructs justice. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2070 at 510
(Chadbourn rev. 1978).
Literal application of the corpus delicti rule evidences its propensity to obstruct
justice. For example, if a defendant is careless enough to leave behind a body or other
corroborating evidence, the rule allows the prosecution to confront him with his
confession. People v. McMahan, 548 N.W 2d 199, 205 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting). The rule bars the use of a more cunning defendant's confession, however
Id
In McMahan, for example, the victim left her apartment with the defendant Id at
200. She was in bare feet, wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts, and did not take her
purse, her thyroid or epilepsy medication, or any identification with her. Id at 200, 209
She promised to return home by midnight, but was never heard from again Id She was
not discovered in any hospital or morgue, she had not recently contacted any of the
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governmental agencies she frequented, and her sole means of support—welfare and
Medicaid checks—went uncollected Id. at 200, 209.
McMahan eventually gave thrpe full confessions detailing the murder. Id. He
explained how he buried the victim iji the basement of his house, then in an alley next to
his house, and eventually placed her pody in trashbags and threw them in a city dumpster
Id. A tracking dog detected a humart scent inside a crawl space and in the alley, and a
police officer testified about a hole irt the basement that had been dug out and filled in.
Id. 202, 209. The police never recovered the murder weapon, nor did they find any
human blood stains in the defendant is house. Id. at 202. Although the court
acknowledged that the nearly five-yqar delay between the alleged murder and defendant's
confession hampered the collection q>f evidence, id., it nevertheless upheld the reversal of
McMahan's murder conviction on the grounds that the evidence did not establish the
corpus delicti. Id. at 203.
Justice Boyle, however, criticized the court's failure to abandon the corpus delicti
rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. See Id. at 209 (Boyle, J., dissenting). He
lamented thatfc6thecommon-law corpus delicti rule operates to shield a recanting
defendant cunning enough to destroy a body or conceal its identity, despite a voluntary
and reliable confession to the crime. That price is too high/' Id.
Other examples of the unjust iresults that the rule often produces are easily
discoverable, even in Utah. For example, in State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Utah
1938), this Court applied the corpus delicti rule to reverse a mother's conviction for
a

murdenng her newborn child, finding that the trial court erred in admitting her multiple
voluntary confessions. Johnson testified that in sub-zero weather on the night of 1
February 1937, she gave birth to a baby boy, unattended, although her mother slept in the
same room and her brother in an adjoining room. Id at 1012 She was unconscious for
an hour or more after giving birth, but when she regained consciousness she discovered
the baby in the bed covered in the vernix caseosa, and with part of the placenta attached
Id She discovered that the baby was not breathing, nor was its heart beating Id She
left the baby under the covers until the next evening when she earned it to a park and left
it in a public toilet. Id.
Johnson told her doctor and the police a different story. Id. A few days after the
baby was discovered, Johnson went to her doctor hoping that an examination would prove
that she had not recently given birth. Id. The examination prove the opposite, and the
doctor asked Johnson whether the baby found in the toilet was hers. Id. Johnson
confessed that she already had enough children, could not raise another, and even
demonstrated to the doctor how she had put her hand over the baby's nose and mouth to
suffocate it. /rf. at 1012-13. A few days later she again told the doctor that she had
suffocated the baby, and explained that she pushed it down under the bed clothes and
covered it up when she was sure that it was dead Id Johnson also confessed to the
deputy sheriff that she killed the baby. Id
This Court upheld the tnal court's findings that Johnson's confessions were
voluntary Id at 1013-14 Nevertheless, this Court determined that the confessions were
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erroneously admitted because there was no proof of the corpus delicti. Id. at 1014-18.
This Court cited the absence of martys of violence on the infant or any external signs of
suffocation, and the doctor's testimolny that the infant died of asphyxiation. Id. at 1016.
In a similar case, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a babysitter's
manslaughter conviction, finding insufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti.
State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 225 (W^sh. 1996). An autopsy revealed that the infant victim
died of either Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) or acute respiratory failure. Id. at
214. A pathologist testified that it was possible that manual interference or suffocation
could begin the process of respiratoiiy failure in an infant but that the interference or
suffocation was not necessarily detectable in an autopsy. Id. The pathologist was unable
to determine whether the death might have been caused by manual interference or SIDS.
Id.
In the days after the infant's death, the babysitter—Aten—put some of her
possessions in storage, asked people to temporarily keep other possessions, and gave
some of them away. Id. at 214. Sh^ told her daughter that she was doing this because
"the sheriff might lock the whole house up." Id. When the baby's mother told Aten mat
the autopsy report showed the baby died of SIDS, Aten told her the report was not true.
Id.
Aten later confessed to the baby's mother that she had killed the baby by
smothering her with a pillow becau$e the baby had cried all night. Id. at 215. In a
separate statement to the police sheiexplained that she put her hand over the baby's mouth
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and nose until the baby calmed down, but that the baby was still fussing when she put the
baby back in bed. Id. at 216-17. Although the court found that Aten's waiver of rights
and confession were voluntary, it nevertheless held that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain her conviction under the corpus delicti rule. Id. at 224-25.3
The corpus delicti rule also hinders prosecutions of child sexual abuse. For
example, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a conviction for first-degree child
molestation because facts independent of the defendant's confession did not establish the
corpus delicti. See State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). Ray and his wife were
sleeping in their bedroom when their three-year-old daughter came into the room asking
for a glass of water. Id. at 904. Ray, who normally slept nude, left the room with his
daughter to get the water. Id. He later returned to the bedroom upset and crying, awoke
his wife, and had a discussion with her. Id. His wife immediately became upset and ran
to check on her daughter, who by this time had fallen asleep. Id. Ray's wife returned to
the bedroom and, after further discussion, Ray placed a call to his sexual deviancy
therapist. Id. at 904-05.
Ray confessed to the police that he gave his daughter a glass of water and took her
back to her bedroom. Id. at 905. When she got into bed he took her hand and placed it on
his penis. Id. After a few seconds the daughter pulled away and Ray returned to his

3

One commentator has aptly described the hazards of applying the corpus delicti
rule in cases involving SIDS. See Catherine L. Goldenberg, Comment, Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome as a Mask for Murder: Investigating and Prosecuting Infanticide, 28
Sw. U. L. REV. 599, 612-17 (1999).
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bedroom where he admitted the act t<f> his wife. Id Ray stipulated to the facts in the
police report and waived his right to trial. Id Nevertheless, the court applied the corpus
delicti rule and reversed his conviction, feeling ''bound to follow our previous rulings on
the issue." Id.
The court did so over Justice Talmadge's well-reasoned dissent, in which he
stated, "[t]he rule of corpus delicti his become a serious impediment to the proper
handling of certain kinds of cases, particularly those involving highly vulnerable or
youthful victims of crime who cannot give voice to the fact of the crime against them."
Id. at 910 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) Justice Talmadge continued, "In cases such as the
one before us, infanticide or child abuse by suffocation, where independent evidence of
the cnme may be virtually unattainable, it is contrary to the interests of justice to permit
x
the corpus delicti rule to prevent the Itner of fact from considenng a confession." Id.

The above cases illustrate the propensity of the corpus delicti rule to "prevent[]
finding the truth." Id. at 910-11. Tlje corpus delicti rule extracts a high pnce "m the form
of reversed convictions of guilty persons, [and] prosecutions abandoned or never begun
for want of independent evidence of the corpus delicti. . . ." Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV at
386. As Justice Talmadge reasoned "[sjtare decisis should not stand in the way of
enhancing the truthfinding purpose <t>f criminal trials." Ray, 926 P.2d at 911.
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Another case that demonstrates how the corpus delicti rule can frustrate justice in
child sexual abuse cases is Commonwealth v Costello, 582 N.E 2d 938, 942 (Mass 1991)
(reversing convictions for rape of a hild and indecent assault and battery on a child
despite the defendant's voluntary cqn fessions).
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4.

The trustworthiness approach is superior because it better
protects a defendant's rights while increasing the
factfinder's ability to ascertain truth.

Under the trustworthiness approach, a defendant's out-of-court statement can be
used against him if the State *'introduce[s] substantial independent evidence which would
tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement/' Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. w,It is
sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a
jury inference of their truth." Id. Once the State has proven the that the out-of-court
statement is trustworthy, then that statement can be used, together with the evidence
independent of the out-of-court statement, to prove the essential elements of the crime.
Id. As the Court explained in Smith, "all elements of the offense must be established by
independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of
corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby
prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused." 348 U.S. at 156.
As Justice Boyle observed in his dissent, the trustworthiness approach more
directly protects the confessing defendant than does the corpus delicti rule. See People v.
McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., dissenting). The corpus delicti
rule insures only that a crime has been committed by someone. Id. The trustworthiness
approach, however, insures that a particular statement is sufficiently reliable for the
factfinder to hear it. Id. Furthermore, the trustworthiness approach applies to any of a
defendant's out-of-court statements, not just inculpatory statements. Compare Opper,
348 U.S. at 91-92 (applying the trustworthiness standard to any out-of-court statement),
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with Johnson* 821 P.2d at 1162 (appfving the corpus delicti rule e\clusi\ely to
inculpatory statements).
The trustworthiness approach, like the corpus delicti rule, protects a defendant who
"confesses" to a cnme that has not been committed. Without the commission of an actual
cnme it would be difficult to discover significant evidence establishing the
trustworthiness of the defendant's confession to the imaginary cnme. The trustworthiness
approach is superior to the corpus delicti rule, however, because it also protects a
defendant who falsely confesses to an actual cnme that someone else has committed.
McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 207 (Bo^le, J., dissenting). "Where there is an indication of
unreliability, 'the trial judge . . . should exercise great care in determining whether the
statements of the accused were corroborated.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Calderon,
348 U.S. 160, 164 (1954). As Justice Boyle observed, the trustworthiness approach
protects a defendant from "a dishonjest police officer, a self-interested accomplice, or a
malicious enemy [who] seeks to frame an innocent defendant by fabricating a story that
the defendant confessed to committ|ing an actual cnme." Id. at 207 n.l 1. The corpus
delicti rule, however, lacks similar protections.
The trustworthiness approach is also supenor to the rule when applied to cnmes
without a tangible injury or loss, such as attempt offenses, conspiracy, or tax evasion. In
these types of cases it cannot be shown that a cnme was committed without identifying
the accused. McMahan, 548 N.W 2d at 207 (Boyle, J, dissenting). Therefore, the corpus
delicti rule requires the State to als|o product evidence of the offender's identity, thereb\
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providing more protection to an accused in these cases "than the rule affords to a
defendant in a homicide prosecution . . . ." Id.: see also, Smith v. United States, 348 U.S.
147, 154 (1954). The trustworthiness approach avoids this absurd result.
The trustworthiness approach is also easier to apply than the corpus delicti rule.
As modern statutory criminal law has increased the number and complexity of crimes,
%

'[s]imply identifying the elements of the corpus delicti . . . provides fertile ground for

dispute/' McCormick, § 147 at 528. Once the elements of the corpus delicti are defined,
a court must then examine whether the independent evidence satisfies those elements,
keeping in mind the numerous exceptions to the rule. Id. On the other hand, the
trustworthiness approach simply examines whether there is substantial independent
evidence to corroborate or establish the truthfulness of the defendant's statement. See
0/?/?er,348U.S.at93.
The trustworthiness approach also increases the factfinder's ability to discover the
truth. In cases without a tangible loss or injury, or where actual loss is shown but
evidence of criminal agency is lacking, the trustworthiness approach allows the factfinder
to hear a validly obtained and voluntary confession, whereas the corpus delicti rule bars
such evidence. See Ray, 926 P.2d at 910-11. As McCormick concluded, if a
corroboration requirement is to be retained, "[t]he Supreme Court's [trustworthiness]
approach," rather than the corpus delicti rule, "is best designed to pursue the realistic
objectives of a corroboration requirement/' McCormick, § 145 at 524.
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Just two and a half years after) Opper, this Court recognized that the corpus delicti
rule should not be "applied to create a device for protecting defendants who reek with
guilt:' State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 35B, 355 (Utah 1957). u[T]he rule should be applied
with caution and not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction to the administration
of justice/' Id. at 376. This Court further cautioned, "[l]egal doctrines, while appropnate
in one setting, may become a deterrent to justice when overxtended [sic]/' Id. (quoting
Note, The Corpus Delicti-Confessiqn Problem, 43 Journal of Criminal Law 214 (1952)).
This Court "will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases,
unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound
because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing
from precedent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (overruling the
automatic reversal rule of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975)). Like the
rule overturned in Menzies, the corpus delicti rule "does not work very well." Id. at 400.
While the rule may have had some utility when this Court decided Weldon, the rule was
unsound from its inception and the growing complexity of the modern criminal code has
only reinforced that conclusion.5 Subsequent constitutional and statutory protections have
surpassed the rule, rendering it an anachronism. To paraphrase Menzies, "candor in the
law would be better served by abandoning [the corpus delicti rule] rather than straining
against its requirements]" by fashiloning broad exceptions. Id. Unlike Judge Learned
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The modern criminal code abolishing all common law crimes became effective 1 Julv
[973. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-102 and 76-1-105 (1999).
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Hand, this Court should not feel constrained by stare decisis to follow the common law
corpus delicti rule, all the while doubting that the rule "has in fact any substantial
necessity injustice. .. ." Daeche v United States, 250 F. 566, 571 (2nd Cir. 1918). The
common law corpus delicti rule is no longer sound and the trustworthiness approach is
superior; this Court should therefore adopt the trustworthiness standard.
II.

IF THIS COURT ADOPTS THE TRUSTWORTHINESS
STANDARD IT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS' DECISION AND AFFIRM DEFENDANTS
CONVICTION BECAUSE HIS CONFESSION WAS
TRUSTWORTHY

Defendant's confession was trustworthy. As discussed above, the trustworthiness
standard allows the factfinder to consider a defendant's out-of-court statement if the
prosecution "introduce^] substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish
the trustworthiness of the statement." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. This evidence need not be
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. Id. Rather, "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration
supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth."
Id. Defendant's confession was admissible under this standard.
Defendant confessed that: the alleged accident occurred in South Salt Lake; it
involved both him and his wife; they saw an uncovered manhole; they decided to
fabncate a story about falling into the hole; they did so in order to obtain money; and thev
in fact obtained money by fraud. R. at 37-38.
Substantial independent evidence tended to establish the trustworthiness of
defendant's confession. See Opper, 348 U S at 93 The evidence established that both
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defendant and his wife sought treatment for injuries allegedly suffered outside the FHP
hospital in South Salt Lake; both reported that they were injured when they fell into an
uncovered manhole outside the hospital; a security officer discovered an uncovered
manhole near the hospital; both defendant and his wife filed an insurance claim based on
the alleged accident; and both received a $50,000 insurance settlement. R. at 37-38. The
independent evidence also established that defendant's confession was voluntary. Id.
Therefore, defendant's confession was admissible as evidence of his guilt under the
trustworthiness standard. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and
affirm defendant's conviction.
CONCLUSION
This Court should adopt the trustworthiness standard, reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals, and affirm defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this lr

day of March 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
charges The State acknowledges that Utah follows
the corpus delicti rule Under that rule, a confession
alone cannot support a conviction. In addition to the
confession, the prosecution must adduce clear and
convincing independent evidence that an injury
occurred and that the injury resulted from criminal
conduct See, eg, State v Allen, 839 P 2d 291, 301
(Utah 1992), State v Johnson, 821 P 2d 1150, 1163
(Utah 1990); State v Nguyen, 878 P 2d 1183, 1188
(Utah Ct App 1994). The State acknowledges that the
stipulated facts did not reflect the existence of
inculpatory evidence independent of defendant's
confession.
After briefing was completed, the State filed a
suggestion that the court certify the appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court in accordance with rule 43 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court declined to
certify the appeal.
In light of the foregoing, the tnal court's denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM.
*1 Defendant asserts that because the State adduced
only his confession as evidence of his guilt, the tnal
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